

**SECRET**

LECTURE ON THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
AND ITS MISSION

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PRESENTED AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

25 MARCH 1948

BY

THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
BRIG. GENERAL E. K. WRIGHT, U. S. A.

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THIS TALK, FROM MY VIEWPOINT, IS  
BEING APPROACHED WITH SOME SHYNESS AND  
CONSIDERABLE MISGIVING--WHEN I THINK OF  
THE STATURE OF YOUR USUAL GUEST SPEAKERS,  
BECAUSE OF THAT, AND WITH DEFERENCE TO MY  
AGE, I HOPE YOU WILL PERMIT A DEPARTURE  
FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND IS A USUAL CUSTOM  
--HANDING MY PREPARED DISCUSSION TO THE  
DIRECTOR AND SHOOTING "OFF THE CUFF".

A DISCUSSION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLI-  
GENCE AGENCY AND ITS MISSION INVOLVES MANY  
ANGLES AND I PROPOSE TO COVER THEM UNDER  
THREE GENERAL HEADINGS:

1. THE BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO  
THE FORMATION OF SUCH AN AGENCY.

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2. THE GENERAL ORGANIZATIONAL  
STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY AND ITS POSITION  
IN THE NATIONAL PICTURE.

3. A MORE DETAILED EXPLANATION  
OF SOME OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENCY.

LIKE ALL THINGS, AMERICAN INTELLI-  
GENCE HAS A HISTORY. IT DEFINITELY HAS A  
LURID PAST. WE BELIEVE IT HAS A BRILLIANT  
FUTURE. BUT THAT FUTURE DEPENDS A GREAT  
DEAL ON A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BY ALL  
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE INTELLI-  
GENCE NEEDS OF THE NATION.

ONE OF THE GREATEST THINGS THAT HAS  
COME OUT OF THE RECENT WAR HAS BEEN THE  
TREMENDOUS GROWTH OF INTELLIGENCE TECH-  
NIQUES AND THE AWARENESS OF BOTH CIVILIAN  
AND MILITARY ELEMENTS OF ITS EXISTENCE.  
BEFORE THE WAR, AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE

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WAS MAINLY A STAFF FUNCTION RELEGATED,  
UNFORTUNATELY, TO AN ALL TOO SMALL A  
POSITION IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

I THINK IT CAN BE SAID WITHOUT  
CHALLENGE THAT BEFORE THE WAR OUR INTELLI-  
GENCE SERVICE COULD IN BUT FEW WAYS COMPARE  
WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA,  
GERMANY, OR JAPAN. WE HAD A POOR INTELLI-  
GENCE SERVICE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THIS  
COUNTRY DID NOT BELIEVE IN IT. IT WAS FELT  
THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUT  
ESPIONAGE AND EVEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE  
GENERALLY.

AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF  
SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO A GLOBAL WAR,  
IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY  
APPARENT. THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY

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TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION. EACH  
NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS THE OLDER  
DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH  
INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF THEIR OWN, EACH  
PRODUCING A MASS OF UNCOORDINATED INFORMA-  
TION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION FOR FUNDS  
AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL  
EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR AND NAVY DEPART-  
MENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
INTELLIGENCE STAFFS--AS DID THE RESEARCH  
AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF O. S. S. THE BOARD  
OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE  
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO  
DELVED DEEPLY INTO THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC  
INTELLIGENCE. NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN  
WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED BRANCHES IN  
LONDON, ON THE CONTINENT, AND IN THE  
PACIFIC AREAS.

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WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN, OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD TO CHOOSE FROM THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, ONI, OR THE O. S. S. --JUST TO NAME A FEW. AND, BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE BEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT ITS REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT BE DISREGARDED.

THIS MIGHT BE A GOOD PLACE TO TALK A LITTLE ABOUT THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES--THE O. S. S. IT WAS ONE OF THE COMPETING AGENCIES MENTIONED, BUT REGARDLESS OF ITS VARIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND CERTAIN OF ITS KNOWN FAILURES,

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IT NEVERTHELESS MARKED A TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AS YOU KNOW, THE O. S. S. WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE O. S. S., ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIELD. IT WAS A STOP-GAP. OVERNIGHT IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO PERFORM THAT THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AGGRESSIVELY SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS, THE WORK OF THE O. S. S. WAS QUITE REMARKABLE AND ITS FAILURES MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ITS SUCCESSES. IT IS

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EXPRESSING IT LIGHTLY TO SAY THAT WE GREATLY  
PROFIT BY ITS ACTIVITIES, ITS EXPERIENCES,  
AND ITS MISTAKES.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OUR PRE-WAR  
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WERE HIGH-LIGHTED BY  
THE STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED  
THE ATTACK ON HAWAII. THE COMMITTEE MADE  
MANY SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN  
INCORPORATED INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING.

TO BRIEF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, THEY FOUND THAT:

1. VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION  
HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY OR THOROUGHLY  
EVALUATED.

2. A GREAT DEAL OF IMPORTANT  
EVALUATED INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN PASSED  
TO FIELD COMMANDERS.

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3. OBVIOUS SOURCES HAD NOT BEEN  
EXPLOITED.

4. THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINA-  
TION OF INTELLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN COORDINATED.  
TO BRIEF THEIR CONCLUSIONS EVEN FURTHER,  
THEY STRESSED THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE  
INTELLIGENCE.

WITHOUT BORING YOU WITH A MASS OF  
QUOTATIONS FROM THE REPORT, IT IS PERTINENT  
TO QUOTE ONE BRIEF PARAGRAPH:

"THE SECURITY OF THE NATION CAN  
BE INSURED ONLY THROUGH CONTINUITY OF  
SERVICE AND CENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY  
IN THOSE CHARGED WITH HANDLING INTELLIGENCE."

THE END OF THE WAR FOUND THE UNITED  
STATES IN A POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL  
IMPORTANCE AND POWER IN A VERY UNSTABLE

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WORLD--AND THAT POSITION MAINTAINS TODAY,  
WE MUST NEVER AGAIN FIND OURSELVES CON-  
FRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING  
PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF INTELLI-  
GENCE COLLECTED, COMPILED, AND INTERPRETED  
BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS COMMON  
KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN JUST  
THAT POSITION, AS REGARDED THE EUROPEAN  
THEATRE, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. FOR  
MONTHS WE HAD TO ~~TRUST~~ <sup>LEAN</sup> BLINDLY AND TRUSTINGLY  
ON THE SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF THE  
BRITISH. OUR SUCCESSES PROVE THAT THIS  
TRUST WAS WELL PLACED.

HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A NATION  
HAVING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, THE UNITED  
STATES MUST NEVER AGAIN BE FORCED TO GO,  
HAT IN HAND, BEGGING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT

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FOR THE EYES--THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE--  
WITH WHICH TO SEE.

TO BRING US UP TO DATE -- OUR WAR  
EXPERIENCE, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT  
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED  
THE HAWAIIAN ATTACK, AND THE STUDIES OF  
MANY OTHER GROUPS AND COMMITTEES, FOCUSED  
ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A CENTRALIZED  
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AS MOST OF YOU KNOW, A NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED BY  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE IN JANUARY 1946. THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WAS DESIGNATED  
AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL  
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. SINCE THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE GROUP HAS ~~NOW~~ BEEN LEGALIZED  
BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947--

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UNDER THE NAME OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--I SHALL NOT DISCUSS THE OLD ORGANIZATION FURTHER--BUT WILL PROCEED TO THE NEW.

YOU ARE ALL ACQUAINTED WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS FUNCTIONS. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS COUNCIL, TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THEREFORE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THE PLACE OF THE OLD NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY, WHICH <sup>WAS</sup> ~~IS~~ SPECIFICALLY ABOLISHED BY THE ACT. IT THEREFORE IS THE AUTHORITY FOR DIRECTING THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND COORDINATION OF ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 PROVIDED <sup>D</sup> FOR A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE,

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FROM EITHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY LIFE. CERTAIN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE THEN INCLUDED, SO THAT THE DIRECTOR SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SUPERVISION, RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS WHICH APPLY TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES. IT PROVIDES THAT HE IS NOT TO POSSESS OR EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISION, CONTROL, POWERS OR FUNCTIONS-- OTHER THAN THOSE HE WOULD EXERCISE AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE--OVER ANY COMPONENT OF THE ARMED SERVICES. THESE CLAUSES WERE INCLUDED IN THE ACT TO ASSURE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE DIRECTOR WOULD BE FREE FROM UNDUE SERVICE POLITICS OR INFLUENCE.

THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT OUR AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENA,

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LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS, OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS. WE ARE MOST HAPPY TO HAVE THIS INCLUDED IN THE LAW. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH POLICE POWERS OR FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ARE PROPERLY A PART OF THE WORK OF THE F. B. I., AND WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO INTERFERE WITH THIS. IT IS A BURDEN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO ASSUME.

WE HAVE CERTAIN DEFINITE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE LAW WHICH I WILL DESCRIBE.

FIRST IS THE DUTY TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS PLANNED COORDINATION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING PRIMARY FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. WE ARE--IN THE FIELDS OF COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATION --WORKING TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS; THAT IS, TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE ROLES AND MISSIONS. AND TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE SERVICES IN CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS.

THE NEXT PROVISION OF THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE CORRELATION AND EVALUATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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THE LAW DIRECTS THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL PROVIDE FOR THE APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IT MAKES THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS DIRECTED TO PERFORM, FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SUCH ADDITIONAL SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN AS CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY. AND THE AGENCY IS FURTHER DIRECTED TO PERFORM SUCH OTHER FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE AFFECTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DIRECT.

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IT MUST ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT, EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. THE EFFICIENT CONDUCT OF THESE FUNCTIONS BY THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS WILL ACCRUE TO THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM. INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COLLECTION. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO THAT DEPARTMENT IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY WITHIN THAT DEPARTMENT.

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THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE NATION. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL NECESSITY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST EVALUATE, CORRELATE, AND INTERPRET THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH IS WITHIN ITS OWN EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED FOR ITS OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, IN ADDITION TO ITS COORDINATING AND COLLECTION FUNCTIONS, MUST DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE ON A NATIONAL, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL, LEVEL. THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CONDUCTED BY THE CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE

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PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD OF  
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. ON THESE ESTIMATES  
THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS  
CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO  
BASE THEIR POLICIES. AND IT MUST BE CLEARLY  
BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
AGENCY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY.

THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM  
OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLI-  
GENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR FORMER  
INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE ESTIMATES  
MUST REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE,  
COMPLETE AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A  
CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS  
MATERIAL, OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD

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MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES, EACH TURNING OUT COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED PRODUCT.

NOW AS TO A GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CIA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE--AND I HOPE TO KEEP IT GENERAL AS I KNOW YOU MUST BE PLAGUED WITH THE REVIEW OF DETAILED ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS WHICH ARE IMMEDIATELY FORGOTTEN. YOU WILL NOTE FROM WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IN ADDITION TO THE FUNCTION OF COORDINATING THE COLLECTION, EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING ACTIVITIES OF OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE, HAS CERTAIN COLLECTION, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION, AND DISSEMINATING OPERATIONS

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OF ITS OWN. TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS  
WE HAVE ESTABLISHED ~~FOUR~~ <sup>FIVE</sup> SEPARATE OFFICES  
EACH UNDER AN ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WITH AN  
OVER-ALL SERVICE TYPE OF EXECUTIVE STAFF.

LET US LOOK FIRST AT THE COMMAND AND  
STAFF PART OF THE PICTURE. THE DIRECTOR  
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE DEPUTY  
DIRECTOR ARE NOT ASSIGNED SEPARATE SPECIFIC  
TASKS AS IT IS INTENDED THAT THE DEPUTY BE  
THE ALTER-EGO OF THE DIRECTOR.

THE STAFF IS ACTUALLY BROKEN DOWN  
INTO TWO SEPARATE STAFFS, ONE PROVIDING  
THE NORMAL EXECUTIVE STAFF FUNCTIONS AND  
ANOTHER, SMALLER STAFF, WHICH CONSIDERS  
ONLY THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL PHASES OF OUR  
OPERATIONS. THE EXECUTIVE STAFF, HEADED


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BY AN EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PROVIDES FOR THE  
PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATIVE, SUPPLY AND  
SERVICES, INVESTIGATIVE, AND AUDIT FUNCTIONS  
OF THE ORGANIZATION ON A WORLD-WIDE BASIS.

NOW AS TO THE ~~FOUR~~<sup>FIVE</sup> MAJOR OFFICES.

THE OFFICE OF OPERATIONS PROVIDES FOR  
THE ENTIRE SCOPE OF OUR OVERT COLLECTION  
ACTIVITIES AND FOR THE CONDUCT OF CERTAIN  
ACTIVITIES OF COMMON CONCERN TO ALL DEPART-  
MENTS AND AGENCIES. THIS OFFICE IS RESPON- 25X1



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IT PROVIDES, THROUGH ITS DOCUMENT BRANCH,  
FOR THE SCREENING OF ALL FOREIGN DOCUMENTS,  
PERIODICALS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC., FOR INTELLI-  
GENCE PURPOSES.

THE OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES  
PROVIDES FOR THE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION  
OF ALL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION  
WHICH FLOWS IN FROM ALL SOURCES, ENGAGES  
IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD WITH  
ALL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, AND PREPARES  
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

THE OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINA-  
TION MONITORS THE FLOW OF ALL INCOMING AND  
OUTGOING INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE  
MATERIAL AND ASSISTS THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS  
AND AGENCIES IN OBTAINING THEIR WANTS ON A  
REQUEST BASIS.

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THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS  
CONDUCTS ALL ORGANIZED FEDERAL ESPIONAGE  
AND COUNTER-ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS OUTSIDE  
THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS FOR  
THE COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. IT  
OPERATES FOR THE DIRECTOR IN COORDINATING,  
IN THE FIELD, THE COVERT AND OVERT INTELLI-  
GENCE COLLECTING ACTIVITIES.

YOU WILL REALIZE THE NECESSITY FOR  
CENTRALIZING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IF WE  
DESIRE TO GIVE THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE  
FIRST TIME IN ITS HISTORY, AN ESPIONAGE  
SYSTEM ON AT LEAST A PAR WITH OTHER GOVERN-  
MENTS. IT IS TRUE THAT ONLY ABOUT 15 PER  
CENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMA-  
TION COLLECTED BY ALL AGENCIES WILL BE  
OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. YET THIS

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GAP MUST BE FILLED AND THE INFORMATION THUS OBTAINED WILL OFTEN GREATLY EXCEL IN IMPORTANCE THE LARGER PERCENTAGE OBTAINED BY OVERT METHODS.

THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION BY CLANDESTINE MEANS HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED AND, UNFORTUNATELY, OVER-PUBLICIZED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING THAT INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. IN THIS WE ONLY FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS, THE POLICY AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY MAJOR FOREIGN POWER.

WHEN PROPERLY PROVIDED FOR AND ESTABLISHED, THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE AGENCY. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BRITISH

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SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OVER HUNDREDS OF YEARS PROVES THIS. THE GERMANS VIOLATED THIS PRINCIPLE--AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE JAPANESE--WITH KNOWN DISASTROUS RESULTS.

FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTIPLICITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. STUDY OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TALKS WITH PEOPLE WHO HAVE OPERATED IN THE FIELD OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, AND INTERROGATION OF TOP INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS OF THE AXIS COUNTRIES, HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE RESULT IS CHAOS. INTERNAL BICKERING AND SNIPING DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE TOO MANY GERMAN SPY ORGANIZATIONS, EACH OF THEM JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL DEVELOPED A POLICY OF SECRECY, SO THAT EACH MIGHT BE

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THE GROUP TO PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT TO THE LEADERS. COORDINATION WENT OUT THE WINDOW.

IF WE ARE TO ENGAGE EFFICIENTLY IN THE CLANDESTINE FIELD, THE MOST SENSITIVE OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, WE MUST DO IT WITH FULL REGARD TO THE EXPERIENCE AND METHODS OF THE FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL.

~~IN CONCLUSION~~ I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT, AS AN OPERATING AGENCY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOW OVER TWO YEARS OLD AND HAS THE OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN FUNCTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR MANY MORE YEARS. WE FEEL THAT MUCH IS STILL TO BE DONE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUT WE ARE ALSO HAPPY

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OVER THE PROGRESS TO DATE. WE HAVE BEEN  
WELL BACKED BY CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT,  
THE CABINET, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND BY  
PUBLIC OPINION. WE HOPE WE CAN CONTINUE  
TO JUSTIFY THEIR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.

THERE ARE NO DOUBT MANY QUESTIONS IN  
YOUR MIND AND I REALIZE THAT, FOLLOWING  
THIS PERIOD, I MUST STAND UP HERE AND  
"TAKE THEM." I ASSURE YOU THAT QUESTIONS  
WHICH CAN BE ANSWERED WILL BE ANSWERED  
FRANKLY AND SINCERELY. I HOPE YOU WILL  
FORGIVE ME IF I REFUSE AN ANSWER BECAUSE  
OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

IT HAS BEEN A PLEASURE AN AN HONOR  
TO BE HERE WITH YOU.

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